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Great read, but let the reader beware

the ancestor of the adventure book

Beyond Krak des ChevaliersIf you needed any further confirmation that Kennedy is a scholar with a puckish sense of humor and a droll wit, you get it at the beginning of his "Note on Names," where he wryly observes that, "Like the naming of cats, the naming of Crusader castles is a complicated problem." Kennedy's writing voice conjures to mind images of a cozy library in some great English country house, where your host relaxes in a satin smoking jacket while both of you swirl brandy in your snifters and discourse about the comparative merits of crumbling castles on the western fringes of Asia. The book's first chapter - a survey of the development of Crusader castle studies from the mid-nineteenth century to the present - beautifully encapsulates Kennedy's discursive style and story-telling skills. "[Emmanuel Guillaume] Rey's life is something of a mystery," he muses, and you want to lean forward from your chair on the opposite side of the fireplace and say, "Tell me more." And he does, with an notable eye for the memorable quote, such as T.E. Lawrence's ironic complaint, while traveling around the Levant in 1909, that he was unable to reach Amman owing to "the unthinking activity of some local Bedawin in tearing up the Hejaz railway."
In form, the book consists of a generally chronological survey of the development of the Crusader castle, with individual chapters on siege warfare and the special features of (respectively) the castles of Templars, Teutonic knights, Hospitallers, and the Muslim princes. Another sign of Kennedy's passionate engagement with this project is the fact that he took all of the 90-some color and black-and-white photographs that illustrate the book himself. (There are also another two dozen plans, sketches, and prints illustrating the text.)
The photographs, together with Kennedy's text, cover not only the well-known structures like Krak des Chevaliers, Belvoir, Saone, and Montfort, but will also introduce you to a fascinating collection of lesser-known castles. Among these are the great Hospitaller citadel of Marqat, near the Syrian coast; the two castles overlooking ancient Petra; and - most curious of all - the cave-castle of al-Halbis Jaldak overlooking the Yarmuk River valley, the subject of a siege memorably described by the twelfth-century historian William of Tyre (which Kennedy helpfully quotes in its entirety). Kennedy's enthusiasm also extends to the humbler fortified towers of the lesser Latin nobility.
Kennedy's secret is plainly that he is both a scholar and a romantic - as anyone who wishes to write effectively about the Crusades should probably be. Let me close this review by quoting his own explanation for his enterprise in producing this book:
"There is something fascinating and frequently moving about forlorn and failed enterprises, those 'old, forgotten far-off things and battles long ago,' however perverse they may now seem. It is impossible for me to stand on the windswept battlements of Crac des Cevaliers, climb to the remote crags of the fortress overlooking Petra or explore the magical stillness of the deserted valley by Bourzey, without feeling a potent mixture of admiration and nostalgia which breathes excitement and emotional commitment into scholarship."
This book can be enthusiastically recommended to history buffs and armchair travelers, as well as to those with a more scholarly basis for their interest.


Goytisolo's perspective on Orientalism

Not Just Another Book About Islam

A well-balanced History of Tibet

Culture, society, and religion in Egypt today

Best one-stop introduction to Iran

Reagan's Special Envoy: Blueprint for Middle East Peacebloody feud unresolved since 1947. "Cursed is the Peacemaker" is
the go-to book for the historical drama of what it took to
negotiate that brief shining moment when there was-- as close as
it gets-- to a cease-fire between Israelis vs. Palestinians and
others in the Arab world.
Author John Boykin (a former editor at Stanford Magazine)
recounts the gripping story through the eyes and viewpoint of
Philip Habib, Reagan's Special Envoy charged with the enormous
task of staunching the bloodshed and destruction in Beirut in
1982...in 1947 and left with an unfulfilled United Nations mandate that
was to have been, like Israel, the provision for their homeland,
some Palestinians relocated to West Beirut where Palestinian
leaders carried on the battle against Israel, which retaliated.
In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and laid siege to Beirut to
destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) once and
for all. The PLO is the umbrella of organizations that leads the
Palestinian diaspora.
President Reagan gave Habib, the Brooklyn-born son of Lebanese
immigrants, the task of talking to the warring sides and
persuading them to make some changes. Everything from vitally
important matters down to the price of Israeli pickles was thrown
on the table and it was up to Habib to sort it out. He convinced
the Israelis to stop shooting long enough for thousands of
Palestinian guerrillas to sail from the Mediterranean port city
under the watchful eyes of a multi-national force of 800 U.S.
Marines, 900 French and 500 Italian soldiers. This was no easy
feat. Habib persuaded the Palestinians to leave their families
behind in the West Beirut refugee areas of Sabra and Shatila with
their safety guaranteed by the multi-national force and the word
of Ariel Sharon.
This very readable story explains how imperfectly Habib
accomplished his task and yet how Habib's work stands as the
blueprint for the diplomacy that a person of iron will and
stature will need if ever there is to be a negotiated end to
this war that rips at the heartland of Christian, Jewish and
Muslim civilizations.
Boykin recounts the history in an engaging way and he's careful
not to assert his own opinions. The viewpoints he presses are
those that he documents were those of Habib, the talented, hard-
working, often gruff U.S. negotiator.
The book's completeness is a tribute to Boykin's persistence in
using, among other resources, the Freedom Of Information Act,
archives at Georgetown University's Foreign Affairs Oral History
Program, and extensive interviews with Habib's peers, his bosses
and underlings to piece together this important story about a
critical juncture in the life of an historical figure who
steadfastly refused to talk to reporters during negotiations.
Boykin provides the listening post for readers to "overhear" the
blunt conversations between Habib and the Marine Colonel James
Mead whom Habib came to rely upon to keep warring parties apart.
But Mead was no patsy. While he came to grudgingly respect Habib,
he was protective of those in his command. Boykin lays out the
negotiating positions of the various sides, noting that the
intransigence, the absolutist positions by Israel and Syria were
non starters.
Boykin conducted interviews with dozens of well-known diplomatic
players who knew Habib well-- everyone from Nobel Laureate Oscar
Sanchez Arias to Henry Kissinger (who knew Habib from his days
negotiating an end to the U.S. war in Viet Nam).
It can safely be said that there can be no peace in the Middle
East until there is a measure of justice for the massacre at
Sabra and Shatila, refugee camps that resemble acres of the
crowded tenement buildings that dot working class areas of New
York City. In these camps, Christian Phalangists went door to
door wantonly murdering more than 800 Palestinians while Israeli
soldiers stood guard seeing to it that no Palestinian could
escape. Details of what led to the massacre, for which even the
Israelis hold Ariel Sharon culpable, are of historical
importance.
Boykin describes what went on behind the scenes just before the
massacre of Palestinians on September 16-18, 1982. It was the
tragedy Habib had labored all summer to prevent and in the end,
he didn't, in part because Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
withdrew the Marines who were charged with keeping the warring
parties apart. When the Marines left, the French and Italians
also left Beirut. That their families would be protected was the
key to persuading the Palestinians to lay down their guns and
leave Beirut. That Ariel Sharon broke his word and allowed his
soldiers to stand guard while mass murder was committed can not
be glossed over, especially since two decades later, Sharon
became Israel's elected leader.
This story is a microcosm for what has gone wrong in the Middle
East. If peace is to come to the region, this story may contain
kernels of the reconstructed blueprint for what, along with iron will, is needed to find a peaceful solution.


A must have for your trip to Cyprus!